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COMMENT
NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEAS
INTRODUCTION

Fisheries1

problems in the North Pacific are not new. In the past
century, disputes between nations have developed over whaling, fur
sealing, halibut and salmon fishing. Currently, crises are again in the
making concerning the utilization of certain fishery stocks of this
area. The purpose of this comment is to provide a framework of
international law of the sea concepts within which the current problems can be examined.
Four major fishing powers are vitally interested in the North Pacific
fisheries. These countries are the United States, Japan, Canada and
the U.S.S.R. In tables compiled by the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization on the 1960 world catch, the principal fishing
countries in the order of their catch were Japan, China (mainland),
Peru, the U.S.S.R., the United States, Norway, Spain, and Canada.'
Although these tables reflect fishing activities by these nations in all
waters, their significance to the North Pacific is readily discernible.
These figures do not include whale catches, which, as compiled for
1959/60, show Japan leading, closely followed by Norway. The
U.S.S.R. also has large whaling fleets, while the United States and
Canada have only a small stake in this fishery.'
This comment will discuss the four major fishing powers mentioned
above, and will concentrate upon their impact in the North Pacific
1 Included within the term "fisheries" are the activities of catching whales and fur
seals, two sea mammals of economic import hunted in the North Pacific.
2 The catch order is expressed in terms of metric tons.
12 FAO YEARBOOK OF
FISHERY STAxISTcs a-33 (1960). The order given for the 1955-59 average, at a-32,
places Japan first, the United States and the U.S.S.R- third and fourth respectively,
and Canada seventh. These tables include freshwater and marine catches, and except
whales. Excellent summaries of the 1960 fishing season may be found in PACIFIC
FISaERMAN, International Yearbook Number (January 25, 1961). See especially at
81 for a review of the Japanese fishing year, and at 115 for the same information on
the U.S.S.R. Since Mainland China does not have distant-water fishing fleets which
penetrate the North Pacific, an examination of her fishing activities is not within the
scope of this comment.
3 Id.
at h-5. To illustrate the respective interests of the four North Pacific fishery
nations in whaling, the 1959/60 figures show the following number of whales caught
by each to be: Canada, 2; United States, 453; U.S.S.R., 11,436; Japan, 18,854. For
the whaling statistics on the 1960/61 season see 12 IN'L WHALING COMM'N RFP.

4-5 (1961).
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area.' The approach chosen has been to delineate the positions of
these States regarding pertinent international law of the sea concepts,
including the principles of contiguous zones and the continental shelf.
The international commissions presently exerting controls in the North
Pacific will also be noted. Particular treatment will then be given to
Alaska, with specific note of the Bristol Bay area-scene of current
conflict between Alaskan salmon interests and the Japanese fishing
industry.
FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS AND THE TERRITORIAL SEA

The principle of freedom of the high seas is one of the most generally recognized rules of international law. Perhaps the most famed
work advocating this principle is Hugo Grotius' Mare liberum (1609),
which is said to have "opened the famous literary controversy over
the freedom of the seas .

.

. ."' From this actively debated stage of

development in the seventeenth century, the concept has become
established as the "cardinal principle of the law of the sea."' In
Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas adopted by the 1958
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea the principle is
clearly expressed: 7
4 For general background information a recommended book is ALLEN, NORTH
PACIFIC (1936).

5 RIESENFELD, PROTECTION OF COASTAL FISHERIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW 8

(1942). See also Heinzen, The 77ree-Mile Limit: Preserving the Freedom of the
Seas, 11 STAN. L. REV. 597, 598-612 (1959).
6 Sorenson, Law of the Sea, INT'L CONC. (No. 520) at 212 (1958).
7 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.53 (1958). The final act and annexes of the 1958
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are reprinted in 7 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q., Special Supplement, The Law of the Sea (1958). The texts of the final act and
conventions are also available in United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Official Records, Vol. II, 132-47 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/38 (1958). Further
references to these conventions will be made by citing the United Nations Document
number.
Eighty-six States were represented at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference which
met at Geneva from February 24 to April 27, 1958. A wealth of material was produced by this Conference, not only in the form of records of the proceedings and the
final act and annexes, but also in the documentations prepared for the consideration of
the Conference participants. The Conference prepared four conventions, adopted a
protocol and nine resolutions. Only the conventions will be noted further at this
point. These conventions were: (1) Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone; (2) Convention on the High Seas; (3) Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas; and (4) Convention on the
Continental Shelf. The rules expressed by these conventions were agreed upon by a
two-thirds majority of the States participating, thereby reflecting the prevailing opinion.
The conventions were open for signature until October 31, 1958. As of that time the
Territorial Seas Convention had been signed by forty-four States, including Canada,
the U.S.S.R. and the United States; the High Seas Convention had received fortynine signatures including the same three nations; the Fishing and Conservation Convention had been signed by thirty-seven States, including Canada and the United States;
and the Continental Shelf Convention had forty-six signatures, among them those of
Canada, the United States and the U.S.S.R. U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/13 (December

1963]

NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES TREATIES

The high seas-being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high
seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and
by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both
for coastal and noncoastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These fre'edoms, and others which are recognized by the general
principles of international aw, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas.
The corollary implicit to the concept of freedom of the high seasinvolves the rights of the coastal State over its marginal waters. These
rights are variously expressed in terms of jurisdiction or sovereignty
over the marginal or littoral sea, but are more frequently designated
by the concept of territorial waters or the territorial sea.' The reasons
for the general recognition of this jurisdiction of the coastal State
have been summarized as security interests, the furtherance of com-

mercial, fiscal and political interests, and the exclusive enjoyment of
sea products within these waters in order to sustain the existence of
the coastal pbpulation.' It has been asserted that the most important
31, 1958). However, each convention must be ratified by at least twenty-two nations
before coming into force. As of February, 1962, the ratification or accession to these
conventions stood as follows: Territorial Sea, 15, including the U.S.S.R. and the
United States; High Seas, 18, including the same two; Fishing and Conservation, 7,
including the United States; and Continental Shelf, 14, including the U.S.S.R. and
the United States. U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/3, REv. 1 (February, 1962). Thus at the
present time, not one of these conventions is in force as a treaty.
In 1960 the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the_ Sea was convened
to consider the two specific questions of breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits,
issues unresolved by the 1958 Conference. No agreement was reached on either
question. See, Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official
Records, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.19/8 (1960). A synoptical table (U.N. Doc. No.
A/CONF.19/4 (1960)) concerning the breadth and juridical status of the territorial
sea and adjacent zones, updating that prepared for the 1958 Conference, is annexed to
this record, id. at 157-63. This table shall hereinafter be cited as Synoptical Table.
For further reference to the 1960 Conference, see infra note 16.
8 This comment does not purport to deal in any detail with the many facets of the
concept of territorial waters. Only the broad and general principles will be given. The
topic has been extensively written upon and the reader is especially referred to JEssuP,
THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927); COLOMBOS,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 77 et seq. (3d ed. 1954); 1 HYDE, INTERNA-

TIONAL LAW § 41 et seq. (2d ed. 1945); McDougal & Burke, Crisis in the Law of the
Sea: Community Perspectives versus National Egoimn, 67 YALE L.J. 539 (1958);
Heinzen, shpra note 5; Sorenson, supra note 6.
0CoLomnos, id. § 77.
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right the coastal State enjoys within its adjacent waters is the exclusive right to control fisheries.'
In addition to this comprehensive jurisdiction over its territorial sea,
the coastal State exercises its most exclusive competence over waters
commonly designated "internal waters," that is, those waters landward
of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured and including
ports, harbors and historic bays." The rules applicable in these waters
are generally accepted and the area itself need not be given further
mention here.' Beyond the territorial sea is a limited area within
which the littoral State claims certain less comprehensive rights; this
area is known as the contiguous zone and will be discussed in greater
detail under the next subtitle.
There are two controversial issues regarding delimitation of the
territorial sea; these revolve around the problem of designating the
inner and outer boundaries of the area. The importance of such limitations is readily apparent when merely the exclusive right to control
fisheries within these waters is recalled. The two-fold problem is:
determining the breadth of the territorial sea, and the baseline from
which that breadth is to be measured.' 3
At the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference no agreement
could be reached upon the breadth of the territorial sea. Thus Article
1 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
merely recognizes that: "The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond
its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its
10 The rank of importance to be given the exclusive fishery rights within the territorial sea is illustrated by the following statement by McDougal & Burke, supra note
8, at 578: "The real impetus behind most of the demands for a broader territorial sea
appear to derive from a demand to monopolize the exploitation of fish or to obtain
revenue by requiring payment for exploitation by nonnationals. Certainly, this interest
is most explicitly stated in the modern demands for extension of the territorial sea,
and indeed it overshadows all other particular interests that might be advanced to
justify the extension."
Regarding the coastal State's jurisdiction, JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 8, says, "The
littoral sovereign has over territirial water rights, powers and privileges which are
in principle the same as those which he possesses on his land territories. His freedom
of action is restrained by the right of innocent passage and the right to seek shelter
in distress." COLOMBOS, id. § 106, summarizes the rights of the coastal State within
its marginal belt as "jurisdiction over foreign ships of war and merchant vessels, police
functions, customs and revenue functions, fishery rights and maritime ceremonial."
11 See 1 SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (4th ed. 1960).
The problem of delimiting waters in bays is covered more extensivelh later in this
comment. A comprehensive judicial expression defining a bay may be found in People
v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939).
12 See H.R. REP. No. 2515, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) for a report on the investigation and study of the seaward boundaries of the United States.
13 These factors are discussed in greater detail in 7he Territorial Seas and Fisheries Disputes - 1, 103 SOL. J. 849-50 (1959). Cf., the summarization of prominent
methods of fixing seaward boundaries in H.R. REP. No. 2515, id. at 15-16.
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coast, described as the territorial sea."" The failure to arrive at any
solution to this controversial question was one of the most serious
shortcomings of the 1958 Conference. 5 The Second United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea met in Geneva from March 17 to
April 26, 1960, to consider only the two specific questions of the
breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits.' The 1960 Conference ended without having adopted any proposals on either question.
Currently, therefore, there is no certainty of an international "rule"
as to the extent of the territorial sea, other than that a- nation may
properly claim at least three miles; claims range from this traditional
three-mile or one league limit1 7 to zones up to 200 miles.
The 1958 Conference was, however, more successful in adopting general propositions regarding baselines from which to measure the territorial sea. 8 The historically established and generally accepted rule
is that the territorial sea shall be measured from the low-water mark
following the sinuosities of the coastline. The same rule is applied
to islands, unless the island is one of a group forming an archipelago."
14 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958).
15 See Sorenson, supra note 6, at 242-52 for a discussion of the deliberations of the
1958 Conference on this issue and the many compromise proposals which were put
forth but defeated. A comprehensive table reflecting the positions of the various
States on the compromise proposals made at both the 1958 and 1960 Conferences has
been compiled by a Japanese scholar; see infra note 16. The Synoptical Table, supra
note 7, of claims to jurisdiction over the territorial sea published with the 1960 Conference materials reveals that while a greater number of the coastal States represented
claimed the customary three-mile or one league limit than any other limit, this number
was far from commanding a majority position.
18 See Bowett, The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 9
INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 415 (1960) for an excellent report on the proceedings of this
Conference. The Final Act of this Conference, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.19/L.15
(1960), comprises only two resolutions. See also Oda, Thre Extent of the Territorial
Sea, 6 JAPAXESE ANNUAL OF IN'L LAw 7 (1962) for an analysis of both Geneva
Conferences on the territorial seas issue. The author presents a comprehensive table
showing the positions of the States upon the various compromise proposals made at
both Conferences.
'7 The mile referred to in this limit is the nautical or marine mile. Thus the threemile limit equals about three and one-half statute miles. The one-league limit likewise
refers to the marine league, equal to three nautical miles. See Jassup, op. cit. supra
note 8, at xxxviii.
Is Articles 3-13 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
deal with this area. U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958).
19 CoLoMBos, op. cit. supra note 8, at § 101 says, "The generally recognized rule
appears to be that a group of islands forming part of an archipelago should be considered as a unit and the extent of territorial waters measured from the center of the
archipelago. In the case of isolated or widely scattered groups of islands, not constituting an archipelago, the better view seems to be that each island will have its own
territorial waters, thus excluding a single belt for the whole group. Whether a group
of islands forms or not an archipelago is determined by geographical conditions, but
it also depands, in some cases, on historical or prescriptive grounds."
Care must be taken to distinguish between coastal and outlying archipelagoes since,
although the 1958 Geneva Conference did not specifically agree upon a method of delimiting the territorial waters of archipelagoes, the former may come within the
straight baselines rule approved in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, infra, and
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A special problem is presented when the coastline is extremely indented
and deeply cut into. In the much written about Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries Case,2" the International Court of Justice held that the Norwegian use of straight baselines in delimiting her territorial sea was
not contrary to international law." The 1958 Geneva Conference
adopted the rule of this case22 but specifically expressed the limits
upon its use in these words:
1. In localities where the coast line is deeply indented and cut into,
or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity,
the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured.
The final problem to be included here under the issue of determining
baselines concerns the special difficulties in delimiting the territorial
waters of bays. Writing in 1927, Jessup noted the absence of an international rule to determine whether a bay is to be considered in whole
or in part a portion of the territory of the coastal State, but stated
that several rules had been advanced for the admeasurement of bays.23
As there given, these rules are: (1) a strict application of the usual
three-mile limit of territorial waters; (2) the theory that all bays
should be considered territorial when the mouth of the bay is not
more than ten miles in width; and (3) the headlands theory-the
general principle of which is to draw a line between headlands of the
adopted by the Conference in the Territorial Seas Convention. A coastal archipelago
is a group or fringe of islands lying directly off the mainland. Illustrative are the
Norwegian "skjaergaard" and the Alexander Archipelago lying off the southeastern
Alaska mainland.
A comprehensive document regarding archipelagoes was prepared for the 1958
Conference: Everson, Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the
Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF. 13/18 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Everson]. This document is found in Vol. I, Official Records, of the
1958 Conference, supra note 7, at 289. Further references to Everson will include the
page number of this volume.
As previously stated, the 1958 Conference made no special reference to archipelagoes
in its conventions. The United States practice re the Hawaiian Islands, an outlying
archipelago, is given by Everson, id. at 299. The Philippines position on the special
claims of an archipelagic nation is set forth in U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF./4/99 (ILC
YEARBOOK, VOL. II, 1956, pp. 69-70). Sorenson, supra note 6, at 239-40, comments
upon the archipelagic position at the 1958 Conference. Indonesia also exerts claims as
an archipelago; see the text of the Indonesian declaration to this effect in Lauterpacht,
77Te ContemporaryPractice of the United Kingdom in the Field of International LawSurvey and Conident, VI, 7 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 514, 538 n. 68 (1958).
20 FisheriesCase, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116.
21 An excellent brief summary of this case is given in The Territorial Seas and
Fisheries Disputes-I, 103 SoL. J. 867 (1959), and by Everson, supra note 19, at 295.
See also McDougal & Burke, supra note 8, at 540 n. 6.
22 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/.52 (1958).
23 JEssuP, op. cit. supra note 8, at 355-82. See also HYDE, op. cit. supra note 8, at
§ 146.
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bay, and measure the territorial sea from this line. It must also be
added that prescriptive claims may be exerted and upheld over bays
of very great size. Jessup stated that the legality of claims to these
so-called "historic" bays "is to be measured, not by the size of the
area affected, but by the definiteness and duration of the assertion
and the acquiescence of foreign powers.""'
In 1958, Sorenson recognized as a general rule that a straight baseline may be drawn across the mouth of a bay and the territorial sea
measured therefrom, but noted that the maximum length of this line
is disputed. 5 He also reserved the historic bay from the operation
of this general rule. The 1958 Geneva Conference adopted a maximum
baseline length of twenty-four miles to enclose waters within bays.
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line

may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as internal waters.
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural

entrance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline
of twenty-four miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as
to enclose the
maximum area of water that is possible with a line of
28
that length.

However, since this Article by its terms applies only to bays the
coast of which belong to a single State, and further specifies that its
provisions do not apply to historic bays, the delimitation of territorial
2
waters in many bays is still open to doubt. Y
The foregoing paragraphs contain only a very general outline of
the broad principles applicable to territorial waters and the high seas.
These comments have been set down only to make more meaningful
the following remarks regarding the positions of the four fishing
powers of the North Pacific waters.
The United States has been a staunch adherent to the three-mile
rule, and has been consistent in this view from her early years as a
24
JEssUp, id. at 382.
25 Sorenson, supranote 6, at 237-38.

26

Article 7 (4), (5), U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958).
E.g., in 1957 the Soviet Government claimed the closure of Peter the Great Bay
as internal waters. (The mouth of this bay extends approximately 115 miles.) This
action was repeatedly protested by the United States Government. See 37 DEi'T STATE
BULL. 388 (1957) and 38 DEPT STATE BuLL. 461 (1958) for the text of notes delivered
to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the United States Embassy at Moscow
regarding this action. The Chairman of the United States delegation in a statement
at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference again referred to the United States protest to
this Russian claim. See Dean, The Law of the Sea, 38 DEP'T STATE BULL. 574, 578
27

(1958).
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nation." The oft-quoted phrases of the Supreme Court in Cunard S.S.
Co. v. Mellon29 bear repeating here: "the territory subject to its [the
United States] jurisdiction includes . . . the ports, harbors, bays and

other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of
the sea extending from the coastline outward a marine league or three
geographic miles." A strong reassertion of the three-mile limit was
made by Arthur H. Dean, Chairman of the United States Delegations
to the 1958 and 1960 United Nations Conferences on the Law of the
Sea." This position is explained by the fact that the United States
is a strong maritime nation and naval power in addition to having
important high seas, as well as coastal, fisheries. These interests require the fullest freedom of navigation. Moreover, as Dean points
out,31 although the concept of the State's rights in territorial waters is
balanced in part by the doctrine of right of innocent passage for
vessels of other nations through these waters, there is no right of innocent passage for aircraft over territorial seas as distinct from the right
for vessels. Thus, extensions and claims to wider territorial seas cuts
down the freedom of air navigation as well as cutting the zone of
naval movement and high seas fisheries activities.
However, in the North Pacific the United States has important
coastal fishery interests that are endangered by strict adherence to the
rule of a narrow territorial sea." This poses the problem of resolving
28 See HYDE, op. cit. supra note 8,at § 142 et seq.; COLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 8,
at § 89. RIESENFELD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 251-63 has a concise chapter on the practice of the United States.
29262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923).
30 Dean,supra note 27,at 579.
31 Ibid. See also Lauterpacht, supra note 19, at 536-37.

32 BINGHAM, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PACIFIC COASTAL FISHERIES,

(1938), strongly advocates protection of the coastal fishery interests, particularly the
Alaskan salmon fishery. See n. 39, p. 74, where the author strongly criticizes "rigid
adherence" to the three-mile doctrine and suggests "pragmatic reasons" for this adherence. The conflicting character of legitimate interests regarding the breadth of the
territorial sea is well put in this remark by BAILEY, AUSTRALIA AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA 7-8 (1959) :
"The concept of the freedom of the seas was, indeed, consonant with the dominant
interests of the great maritime powers of the West. But the truth is that the freedom
of the seas.., is consonant with the dominant interest of all States ...which depend
upon access to the coasts, and to the waters adjacent to the coasts, of other countries.
...Over against this distant-waters interest stands the dominant interest of those
States whose nationals are chiefly concerned in the exploitation of the waters along the
coastline of their own State. Such an interest may spring from the absence of international or oversea shipping lines (or airlines), from the presence of rich fisheries
along their own coastline or the absence of regular dependence on distant-waters
fisheries, or from a particular concept of national defence and security. For one or
more of these reasons, a coastal State may be more concerned to extend its authority
in the waters adjacent to its coast, even to the point of reserving them exclusively for
the use and exploitation of its own nationals, reckoning that on balance the sacrifice
of access to the waters of other States would cost it less than it would gain in its own
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overall policy in the light of this conflict between legitimate interests.
Since other methods are available to exert protective jurisdiction over
coastal fisheries without requiring an extension of the territorial sea,
the conflict is arguably solvable in this manner. These alternative
methods will be discussed subsequently.
The three-mile limit is recognized in the Alaskan state commercial
fisheries regulations in the following definition:"
101.20 Waters of Alaska.
For the purposes of the regulations in this part, the term "waters of
Alaska" north and west of the International Boundary at Dixon Entrance are defined as including those extending three miles seaward:
(a) From the coast.
(b) From lines extending from headland to headland across all
bays, inlets, straits, passes, sounds and entrances.
(c) From an island or group of islands, including the islands of the
Alexander archipelago, and the waters between such groups of islands
and the mainland.
As a seafaring nation with perhaps the strongest interests in high
seas fisheries, Japan vigorously adheres to the three-mile rule. Her
history has been consistent in this respect "since her entry into the
international community."" Japan's main area of high seas fisheries
is the North Pacific, and her fishing vessels ply the waters off the coasts
of Alaska and the U.S.S.R. 3"
Like the United States and Japan, Canada also supports the threemile limit. Canada's early years are, of course, identified with the
principles asserted by Great Britain, one of the earliest proponents
of the fullest freedoms of navigation and the three-mile doctrine."
waters .... But in fact most States will contain interests, and perhaps organized interests,
33 of the most conflicting character."
Alaska Adm. Code, tit 5, ch. 1, para. 101.20. The regulations in this chapter
became effective February 2, 1962.

34 RmENFELD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 247; cf. JEssuP, op. cit. supra note 8, at 45-46.

The Japanese position is well explained in Oda, Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3 JAPANESE ANuAL OF INT'L LAW 65 (1959). See
especially the statement of the Japanese delegation to the Conference on the importance
of the sea to Japan, at 66-67.
35 For an extensive coverage of the Japanese salmon fishing interests in the North
Pacific see MINGHr, THE CONFLICr OF SAL N FIsHING POLICIES IN THE NORTH
PACIFIC (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, 1959), especially at 9-31. Japanese fishing activities in the Northwest Pacific are ably discussedin both historical and modern-day settings by Ohira, Fishery Problems Between
Soviet Russia and Japan, 2 JAPANESE ANNuAL OF INT'L LAW 1 (1958). For further
reference see Note, A Map Analysis of Japan's Fishery Problems, 3 JAPANESE
AxNUAL OF INT'L LAW 103 (1959).
36 See JEssup, op. cit. supra note 8, at 10-18; RIESENFELD, op. cit. stipra note 5, at
129-71.
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Canada's interests in the North Pacific, however, are similar to those
of the United States. She is in the position of a coastal State attempting to exert conservation measures and protective jurisdiction over
fishery stocks historically utilized by her fishermen, and presently
endangered by high seas fishery activities of others. Although the
Synoptical Tables compiled in connection with both Geneva Conferences under special limits list a Canadian twelve-mile fishery limit,
the law upon which this listing is based does not apply to foreign
fishing vessels," 7 which fish to within three miles of the shores. The
Fisheries Council of Canada is presently urging declaration of a
twelve mile fishing limit to protect its coastal sea resources from
foreign fishing activity."
It is interesting to note that when Canada acquired the treatymaking power independent of Great Britain, the first treaty she
signed was the Halibut Treaty with the United States, which has been
lauded as one of the finest examples of international cooperation to
protect a high seas fishery stock.3"
The U.S.S.R. claims a twelve-mile territorial sea.4" Historically,
the Russian position has been inconsistent. Czarist Russia made varying claims over her marginal belt dependent upon the interest in issue, 4
and also denied that international law had any rule limiting the extent
of territorial waters." The Soviet Government has adhered to a twelvemile limit and is the leader of a strong bloc of States modernly asserting the claim.
37 Synoptical Table, supra note 7, at 158. This Canadian statute is printed in U.N.
Doc. No. ST/LEG/Ser.B/8 (1959) at 22. This twelve mile distance does not have
any application to Canadian fishing vessels operating on the Pacific Coast.
38 Seattle Times, Jan. 28, 1963, p. 10.
39 This first treaty was the Convention With Great Britain for the Preservation of
the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean, March 2, 1923, 43 Stats. 1841, T.S.
No. 2900. The most recent revision of this treaty is the Convention With Canada for
the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering
Sea, March 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900. The first halibut treaty
and its importance to Canada was commented upon by Hon. James Sinclair in an
address entitled Canada and the Abstentions Principle given at a 1959 conference on
fisheries management held at the University of Washington. A summary of these proceedings was published by the University under the title BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC
ASPECTS OF FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (1959) [hereinafter cited as FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE]. See pp. 118-19 of this publication for Sinclair's remarks upon this
subject.
40 Synoptical Table, supra note 7, at 162. A concise statement of the Soviet position
is given in U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATION AND DocuMENTS-1956, Vol. 51, at pp. 492-95. This publication will be referred to as War
College Publication.
41 See JEssuP, op. cit. supra note 8, at 26-31; COLOarBOS, op. cit. supra note 8, at §
91; RIESENFELD, op. cit. supra note 5, at 194-203; Heinzen, supra note 5, at 632-36.
42 JESSUP, id at 29-30.
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CONTROLS BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA

It is generally agreed that the coastal State may exercise certain
controls in waters beyond the territorial sea. These recognized controls include customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary regulations,
and have in general practice been limited to an area of twelve miles
from the baseline for the measurement of the territorial sea.4" This
area is designated the contiguous zone; its practical purpose is summarized in this statement:44
The real function of the contiguous zone concept has been to serve as
a safety valve from the rigidities of the territorial sea, permitting the
satisfaction of particular demands through exercise of limited authority
which does not endanger the whole gamut of community interests.
Another example of control beyond the territorial seas is the claim
asserted by many coastal States to the continental shelf.45 This right
as generally recognized acknowledges the coastal State's exclusive
right to exploit the resources of the sea-bed and subsoil," but does
not change the status of the superjacent waters or airspace. The first
claim to the continental shelf was made by the United States in 1945; "
4 Article 24(1), (2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958), expresses the controls generally recognized in the contiguous zone:
"1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may
exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations
within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within the territory or'
territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
The Synoptical Table, supra note 7, reveals that the claims of the four North Pacific
fishing nations with respect to special limits are: (1) Canada: customs, 12 miles;
criminal jurisdiction, 3 miles; civil jurisdiction, 3 miles; fishing, 12 miles; (2) Japan:
neutrality, 3 miles; (3) U.S.S.R.: no limits for special purposes claimed, but breadth
of territorial sea claimed is 12 miles; (4) United States: customs, 12 miles; sanitary
regulation,
3 miles.
44
McDougal & Burke, supranote 8, at 581.
45 See the text of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
13/L.35 (1958). Article 1 states in part, "For the purpose of these articles, the term
'continental shelf' is used as referring (a) to the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine
areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent water admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the sea-bed and subsoil
of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands." This Article provides for
the rights of the coastal State as "rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its
natural resources."
46Article 2(4) of this Convention, ibid., defines natural resources to include "living
organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move
except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil."
47 Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 59 Stat. 884 (1945). Sorenson, mspra note 6,
at 226 notes that there was a 1942 agreement between the United Kingdom and Venezuela dividing their rights to the submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria.
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declarations by others have rapidly followed, so that by 1960 some
thirty-two such claims existed.48
The 1958 Geneva Conference did not include fishery regulations
within its statement on the contiguous zone. This exclusion was apparently based on the idea that freedom of fishing is an essential element of the broader rule of freedom of the high seas. However, even
before the 1958 Conference it was widely recognized that the coastal
States have a special interest with regard to fisheries in the high seas off
her coastline. This interest has generally been expressed in terms of
conservation of fishery stocks. By Presidential Proclamation in 1945,
the United States announced a policy of establishing zones for fishery
conservation in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coastline."
This policy, however, has not been effectuated.
The question of special limits for fishery purposes was sharply dis48 Synoptical Table, supra note 7. Sorenson, ibid., explains that these claims had
been made by "some twenty states, and the United Kingdom with respect to a dozen
dependent territories." Although the majority of the claims have expressly limited
themselves to the sea-bed and subsoil, others asserted sovereignty over superjacent
waters. Of the four North Pacific nations only the United States has claimed the continental shelf.
49 See the text of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.54 (1958), where Article
6(1) reads, "A coastal State has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea."
The operation and significance of this convention is explained by Sorenson, supra note
6, at 211-25, and Bishop, 77e 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conselvation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 1206 (1962).
5o Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 59 Stat. 885 (1945). The pertinent portion
of this proclamation is as follows:
"In view of the pressing need for conservation and protection of fishery resources,
the Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish conservation
zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States
wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed and maintained
on a substantial scale. Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be developed
and maintained by its nationals alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject
to the regulation and control of the United States. Where such activities have been or
shall hereafter be legitimately developed and maintained jointly by nationals of the
United States and nationals of other States, explicitly bounded conservation zones may
be established under agreements between the United States and such other States;
and all fishing activities in such zones shall be subject to regulation and control as
provided in such agreements. The right of any State to establish conservation zones
off its shores in accordance with the above principles is conceded, provided that corresponding recognition is given to any fishing interests of nationals of the United States
which may exist in such areas. The character as high seas of the areas in which such
conservation zones are established and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation
are in no way thus affected."
Ten years later a succinct statement of the problem of conserving fisheries resources
while maintaining the freedom of the seas was given in 32 DEP'T STATE BULL. 696
(1955), and the United States position is delineated at 697 as a firm conviction that
the solution to the problem lay in "negotiating agreements having as their objective
the management of the exploitation of the fisheries resources in such a way as to
maintain their maximum productivity for the beneficial use of all the interested
parties."
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puted at both Law of the Sea Conferences and no satisfactory conclusion to the problem was adopted. Proposals to allow a contiguous
fishing zone extending to twelve miles without a general increase in
the breadth of the territorial sea were advanced in various forms
by the Canadian and United States delegations, but fell short of adoption. 1 Presently, no general rule regarding this problem can be stated.
Regulation and conservation of high seas fisheries can be achieved
by treaty. The United States is party to several successful endeavors
in this direction, but, like all treaties, they bind only the signatory
nations, and their effectiveness with respect to certain high seas fishery
stocks is therefore of limited value. At least six international agreements currently in effect are worthy of mention with regard to the
North Pacific fisheries. These are: (1) Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals,52 between Canada, Japan, the
U.S.S.R., and the United States; (2) International Whaling Convention and Schedule of Whaling Regulations," to which currently seventeen nations are parties, including Canada, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and
51 See notes 15 and 16, supra, for reference to the compromise proposals. For the
text of proposals made at the Second Law of the Sea Conference by the United States
see U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.19/C.1/L.3 (1960); by Canada, U.N. Doc. No. A/
CONF.19/C.1/L.4 (1960); by the two jointly, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.19/C.1/...10
(1960) and U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.19/L.11 (1960). An example of the text of one
of these compromise proposals is this one introduced by Canada at the 1958 Conference, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/C.1/L.77/Rev. 3 (1958):
"1. A State is entitled to fix the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit of six
nautical miles measured from the baseline which may be applicable in conformity with
articles 4 and 5.
2. A State has a fishing zone contiguous to its territorial sea extending to a limit
twelve nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of its territorial sea is
measured in which it has the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of
resources of the sea as it has in its territorial sea."
the5 living
2
Feb. 9, 1957, 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 3948. The historic predecessor
of this current agreement was the treaty between the United States, Great Britain,
Japan, and Russia, July 7, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542, T.S. No. 564, which was entered into at
a time when the fur seal herds of the North Pacific were in danger of extermination
from over-hunting. The fur seal controversies are extensively discussed in LEONARD,
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF FIsHERIEs 55-95 (1944) ; the agreements are noted in
WAR
COLLEGE PUBLICATION, op. cit. supra note 40, at 345.
53
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849. The amendments to the schedule
are cited in TREATIES IN FORCE 282 (1961). See Note, A Map Analysis of Japan's
Fishery Problenms, supra note 35, at 108 which sets out the text of the notification of
Japan's withdrawal from this agreement, to be effective June 30, 1959. However, this
notice was rescinded and Japan continues to adhere to the convention. 11 INT'L
Norway rejoined the convention effective as of
WHALING Comz'N REP. 6 (1960).
September 23, 1960, after a period of withdrawal. 12 INT'L WHALING CoMM'N RE'. 3
(1961). The Netherlands, an original member nation, has withdrawn and not rejoined.
The text of this convention may be found in WAR COLLEGE PUBLICATION, id. at
300-15. This treaty establishes the International Whaling Commission which is given
extensive regulatory powers over the conservation and utilization of whale resources.
However, the success of this Commission has not been highly remarked; e.g., comments
by Sinclair, supra note 39, at 120.
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the United States; (3) Treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics concerning Fisheries on the High Seas in the North
Pacific Ocean; 54 (4) International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,55 a tripartite treaty between Japan,
Canada, and the United States; (5) Convention for the Protection,
Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the
Fraser River System,56 and, Protocol Amending the Convention of
May 26, 1930 for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the
Sockeye Salmon Fisheries to Include Pink Salmon in the Fraser
River System,57 to which agreements the United States and Canada
are parties; and (6) Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut
Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea,5" another
bilateral treaty between the United States and Canada. Of particular
interest to the United States coastal fishery industry in the Northeastern Pacific are the latter three agreements, and only these will be
commented upon further.
The principle of conservation of high seas fishery stocks through
54 May 15, 1956; the text and annex to this treaty can be found in WAR COLLEGE

supra note 40, at 361-68. This treaty sets up a Japanese-Soviet fisheries
commission, with certain regulatory powers over the catch, area, season, and gear to be
used in salmon, herring, and crab fisheries in specified Northwestern Pacific areas.
For further information on Soviet-Japanese fishery problems see Ohira, supra note 35.
For an indication of the jockeying between these nations to reach agreement under
this treaty see 57 PACIFIC FISHERMAN, No. 3, at 11 (1959) ; id., No. 5, at 31.
s5 May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786. The text of this treaty
is reprinted in WAR COLLEGE PUBLICATION, supra note 40, at 347-56. This treaty
creates the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission; its functions are set out
in Article III. The stocks of fish controlled by this agreement are salmon, halibut, and
herring. Article XI provides that the convention shall enter into force on the date of
the exchange of ratifications (which was June 12, 1953), and that it shall continue in
force for ten years and thereafter until one year from the day on which notice of
termination is given by one party whereupon it shall terminate as to all parties.
56 May 26, 1930, 50 Stat. 1355, T.S. No. 918.
57 Dec. 28, 1956, 8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1057, T.I.A.S. No. 3867. See the note on these
agreements in WAR COLLEGE PUBLICATION, supra note 40, at 345-46. The Commission
operating under these agreements is the International Pacific Salmon Commission.
Its work has been very successful in regulating these salmon runs of the Fraser.
Bulletins and reports of the Commission are available in the Fisheries Library of the
University of Washington.
58 March 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900. The text of this agreement is reprinted in WAR COLLEGE PUBLICATION, supra note 40, at 357-60, and the
background of the agreement is given at 356-57. This convention continues what is
recognized as one of the most successful international commissions to conserve a
high seas fishery stock. This commission is the International Pacific Halibut Commission. Through careful management and consistent conservation efforts by the
Governments and fishermen of the United States and Canada, the badly depleted
halibut stocks of three decades ago have been developed to the point of the maximum
sustained yield and the halibut industry is an economic boon to both nations. This
comment does not purport to set forth any scientific data on the subject; for a general background see FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, supra note 39, at 39-86.
The reports, bulletins, record of proceedings and statistical yearbook of the Halibut
Commission are available in the Fisheries Library of the University of Washington.
PUBLICATION,
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international cooperation has been successfully demonstrated in the
operations of the International Pacific Halibut Commission and the
International Pacific Salmon Commission. These Commissions excerise
regulatory powers respectively over the halibut and sockeye and
pink salmon of the Fraser River System. Through extensive conservation programs and adherence to regulatory schemes, these fishery
stocks have been built up and maintained at optimum sustained yield
levels. This yield could be seriously affected by the addition of a nonregulated fishery fleet which could harvest the product of expensive
conservation efforts of others. Since treaties have no effect upon the
conduct of non-signatory nations, the principle of freedom of the
seas arguably would allow such fishery activities. This danger to
the halibut and salmon conservation programs of Canada and the
United States is very real in view of the well-equipped and successful
distant-water fishing fleets of both Japan and the Soviet Union. Japan's
participation in these fisheries has been regulated by the North Pacific Fisheries Convention. However, there is nothing to stop the
Soviets from fishing in these international waters, and Soviet vessels
are in fact being observed in the Gulf of Alaska and other areas off
the Alaskan coastline,59 although available evidence indicates that
these vessels are not engaged in salmon or halibut fishing.
The North Pacific Fisheries Convention between Canada, Japan,
and the United States has been effective in the post-war years to keep
the large Japanese distant-water fleets of factory and freezer ships
from invasion of the halibut, salmon and herring stocks in large areas
of the Northeastern Pacific.
The concept of abstention was introduced into international fisheries
agreements in this treaty. A comprehensive explanation of this principle was prepared for the 1958 Geneva Conference by Richard Van
Cleve, director of the University of Washington School of Fisheries: 9
The concept is well defined in this quotation from Edward W. Allen: 6'
The essence of the proposed treaty is that where one or more nations
have engaged in the intensive scientific research of a specific coastal
59
E.g., see the report on observations made of Soviet trawlers in the Gulf of Alaska
in 24 CommERciAL FiSHIEr s REviEw, No. 9, at 11-12 (1962). The taking of large
catches of ocean perch was noted. For further reports on the activities of Soviet fleets
see Seattle Times, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 13. Both the Soviets and Japanese maintain large
king crab fleets in the Bering Sea; 58 PAci ic FIsHaERmAN, No. 6, at 8 (1960).
60 Van Cleve, he Economic and Scientific Basis of the Principle of Abstention,

U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/3 (1958).
61 Allen, A New Concept for Fishery Treaties, 46 Am. J. INT'IL L. 319, 321 (1952).
For further reference see the previously noted speech by Sinclair, supra note 39, at
116-25.
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fishery, have subjected it to conservation regulation, and are making
approximately maximum use of it upon a sustained-yield basis, then,
in the interests of maximum world food production and in light of
equitable and peaceful international relationships, other nations which
have not participated in such research, regulation or previous exploitation should recognize these conditions and agree to restrain their nations from participating in such fishery.
Although the United States and Canada urged inclusion of this principle in the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, the measure failed to be adopted. "2 Japan
has been critical of the abstention principle,63 although in recent meetings of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission, the
Japanese, through this principle, gained the important concession to
fish halibut in portions of the Eastern Bering Sea which had heretofore been closed to them.6" The reason for this opening of important
grounds to the Japanese was the lack of a sufficient showing that
stocks were being fully utilized, one of the necessary elements under
the absentation concept. The Commission's action has been sharply
criticized by American fisheries interests.65 This criticism may be a
preview of the controversy between the American and Japanese fishing
industries which could develop if Japan exercises her termination rights
under the treaty. The treaty allows notice of termination to be given
for the first time June 12, 1963, which would become effective one
year later. What action the Japanese will choose to take is of course
62 See the account given by Bishop, supra note 49, at 1225-28.
63 E.g., see accounts given in 24 COMMERCIAL FISHERIES REvIEW, No. 9, at 91-92
(1962), which report the opposition of the Japanese salmon industry and the Japanese
Socialist Party to the abstention principle.
64 See the report given in Seattle Times, Nov. 18, 1962, pp. 1, 10. This source also
notes that herring fisheries off the coast of British Columbia in one area had been removed from the abstention list, but adds that the Japanese were not expected to fish
this area.
65 See Seattle Times, Nov. 19, 1962, p. 2; id. at Nov. 20, 1962, p. 8; id. at Dec. 8,
1962, pp. 1, 10. See also an editorial in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 26, 1962,
p. 12.
66 It has been suggested that American officials have a retaliatory weapon in the
form of action against Japanese imports. "77e new Trade Expansion Act gives the
President authority to take steps toward restrictions in the American market for foreign exports of fish caught under conditions which violate conservation practices." (All
italicized in original.) Editorial, Seattle Times, Nov. 13, 1962, p. 8. The Alaska Fishermen's Union has suggested two solutions to force the Japanese to comply with good
conservation principles. These are: (1) federal legislation to prohibit the sale of
Japanese canned salmon on American markets; (2) education of the American housewife to the merits of buying American canned salmon. 57 PACIFIc FISHERMAN, No. 5,
at 8 (1959). For an example of a bill directed at prohibition of the import of fish that
had been taken by methods violative of our conservation regulations, see S.2707, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). This proposal, introduced by Senator Warren G. Magnuson
of Washington, was not enacted into law.
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unknown, but that tension over fishing "rights" in the North Pacific
will increase during the coming months is a certainty.
ALASKA: FISiiERIES JURISDICTION

Prior to statehood, the two agencies responsible for the management
of the fishery resources of the Territory of Alaska were the Department
of the Interior and its predecessor in function, the Department of
Commerce. 7 The Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries were the agents of the Department of Interior in
carrying out this function. The Territorial Government of Alaska included the Alaska Fish and Game Department and the Fisheries
Experimental Commission." With the advent of statehood, the jurisdiction of fishery resources within state waters passed to the newly
created State of Alaska. The Department of Fish and Game and the
Board of Fish and Game" are the state agencies charged with the
responsibility of management of fishery resources.
The major fishery in Alaska is salmon; fishery activities for this
resource are generally centered in the Southeastern, Central and Northwestern waters. Economic and biological aspects present a picture of
extreme complexity with regard to this resource. Much has been
written on this subject,70 and no attempt to explore it is made in this
comment. Suffice it to say that the salmon industry was an essential
element of revenue in the territorial structure; presently tax revenue
from this source to the State of Alaska comprises less than seven
percent of the gross tax revenue of the state.7 ' However, the industry
still plays an important part in the economy of the state because of the
employment it provides for a substantial number of inhabitants." The
industry is likewise of importance to the Puget Sound region for a
07 This background information was supplied upon request from the United States
Department of the Interior.

68 See ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, HANDBOOK ON ALASKA TERRITORIAL GovERNMENT 35-36 (rev. ed. 1957) for a statement of the basic organization, duties and
functions of these two agencies.
69 See ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK ON ALASKA STATE
GOVERNMENT 33-36 (1960) for a summary of the organizations and functions of these

bodies.

70 Extremely valuable for its extensive bibliography as well as its content is
MINGHr, THE CONFLICT OF SALMON FISHING POLICIES IN THE NORTH PACIFIC (un-

published Master's thesis, University of Washington, Seattle, 1959). A good discussion will also be found in FISTmaES MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE, supraz note 39, at
90-114.
71 See ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REVENUE AND TAXATION IN ALASKA, PT. I,
HANDBOOK 50-60 (1962).
72 See ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, REVENUE AND TAXATION IN ALASKA, PT. IL
EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 58 (1962).

A
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similar reason since the greatest percentage of migratory workers who
go north during the salmon season are from this area.
It is generally agreed among fishery experts and economists that
the Alaskan salmon industry is in a very precarious condition. 3 The
unhealthiness of the industry can be attributed to many factors, such
as over-entry into the fishery, conservation regulations which foster
inefficiency of operation, and in some instances, diminishment of returning runs. However, another factor which will be given further
onsideration here is the competition of foreign fishery activities,
specifically that of the Japanese.
Intrusion of the Japanese into the Alaskan salmon areas is not
a new problem. Prior to World War II the threat of wholesale Japanese "invasion" into this fishery in the Bristol Bay region caused
immediate and sharp repercussions. The problem at that time was
solved through diplomatic channels."4 The major portion of the salmon
resources supporting the Alaskan fishery has been protected since 1952
by the operation of the North Pacific Fisheries Treaty. Under the
terms of this international agreement the Japanese fishing effort for
this resource has been confined to areas west of the 175 degree West
Longtitude line. At the commencement of the treaty period, scientific evidence indicated that the utilization of this line to demark the
limit of the abstention zone would provide complete protection for the
American-spawned salmon. However, evidence currently available
indicates that there is an area of inter-mingling of Asian-spawned and
American-spawned salmon of the Bristol Bay area in waters west of
the abstention zone. Japanese fishery activities in this area have
therefore, without any violation of the international agreement, been
instrumental in diminishing the runs of salmon returning to the Bristol
Bay area."
If the Japanese do not choose to continue to operate under the terms
of the treaty, the large distant-water fleets of that nation could fish
73

See

FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE,

supra notes 39, 70.

After an exchange of notes the Japanese government withdrew its fishery vessels
from the area. The incidents aroused high feelings; an excellent summary and background information can be found in LEONARD, supra note 52, at 121-36. See also Allen,
74

Bristol Bay Presents Issue Between American System of Fishery Conservation and
Foreign. System of Unrestricted Exploitation, Address given before Commonwealth

Club of California, San Francisco, March 3, 1939, and broadcast over NBC Pacific
Coast radio network.
75 McDOUGAL & BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 953-55 (1962).
Of
particular concern were the low 1958 Bristol Bay salmon runs. See 57 PACIFIC FISHERMAN, No. 1, at 6 (1959). For a report on the large Bristol Bay run of 1960 see 58
PACIFIC FISHERMAN, No. 9, at 7 (1960) ; speculation on how heavily the Japanese had
fished this run is advanced, id. at 12.
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directly off the Alaskan coast in international waters. It is therefore
pertinent to determine the delimitation of territorial waters off the
Alaskan coastline, for under the rules of international law previously
discussed, it is agreed that the coastal State has the right to exclusive
fisheries in the marginal belt which comprises her territorial sea."6
The three-mile limit which the United States has traditionally recognized is of course the base point from which to launch any discussion re delimiting the marginal belt off the Alaskan coastland. The
Alaskan coastline measures 26,000 miles and presents extreme variations in geographic configurations. The coastline variations selected for
additional comment are located in two of the major salmon fishery
areas, the Southeast and Northwest. These variations are respectively: (1) the Alexander Archipelago and (2) Bristol Bay.
(1) The southeastern region of Alaska is commonly referred to as
the Alaskan "panhandle." It comprises a narrow strip of mainland and
an adjacent chain of islands connected by intricate waterways. The
rugged mainland is sharply cut into by arms of water. The area is
dotted with hundreds of islands, the group being designated the Alexander Archipelago. These waterways comprise the main mode of
transportation between the land areas, whereon are situated the major
salmon canning and lumber and pulp industries.77 This area is the
second most populated region of Alaska, but its population basis comprises over 98% civilians, leading the civilian-military ratio of the
other two regions." The waters of this area support a vital portion
of the Alaskan fisheries industry. For this reason as well as the
peculiar geographic problems it poses, delimitation of these waters will
be considered.
In practice, these waters are commonly understood to be inland
waters of the state of Alaska. Their geographic configuration is such
that to delimit the waters of territorial seas three miles from each
island would result in a system of overlapping lines, or in narrow
uneven strips of high seas. This configuration is designated a coastal
archipelago. The Alaska commercial fisheries regulations define the
term "waters of Alaska" in this area as "those extending three miles
76

In addition, the legitimacy of the interest of the coastal State with regard to conservation of fishery stocks in areas contiguous to its coastline, discussed previously,
should be recalled at this point. It must be noted, however, that there is far from a
universally accepted principle in this area and the concept is in the flux of development.
77 ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, op. cit. supranote 72, at 60.
78 Id., at 54. The three generally used regional divisions are Southeast Alaska,
Central and Interior Alaska, and North and West Alaska; id. at 37.
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seaward . . . from an island or group of islands, including the islands

of the Alexander Archipelago, and the waters between such groups of
islands and the mainland."79 These are the exact words which appeared
in the Department of Interior regulations in effect just prior to statehood.8"
Applying the methods for delimiting territorial seas adopted by the
1958 Geneva Conference to this area, it appears that the straight
baselines method approved by the International Court of Justice in
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and adopted by the Conference
in Article 4 (1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone would be applicable."1 The mainland is cut into by deep
fiords and hundreds of islands fringe the coast. Under this method,
the islands would be treated as a unit. This result would be achieved
by drawing a series of straight lines connecting points on the islands
and delimiting the territorial sea three miles beyond this baseline.
In the Fisheries Case, the use of baselines which extended over forty
miles in the longest instances was approved by the court. No landed
areas in the coastal islands off southeastern Alaska are thus divided.
Although the fringe of islands off the Norwegian coastline is of a more
intricate nature than that of the Alexander Archipelago, - it seems
that the similarities of the two are more numerous than the differences.
Moreover, the geographic realities of these islands, in that their locale
dictates usage primarily or exclusively by the coastal State itself,
would lend support to a usage and prescriptive claim. In addition, the
ratification by the United States of the Territorial Sea Convention
which has adopted the straight baseline method of the Fisheries Case
can be urged to advocate adherance to this view in applicable geographic configurations. This argument has particular cogency in view
of a recent statement by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in regard to
this convention:
Although the Convention is not yet in force according to its terms
because the twenty-two States have not yet ratified or acceded to it,
nevertheless, it must be regarded in view of its adoption by a large

majority of the States of the world as the best evidence of international
law on the subject at the present time. .
79 These regulations are cited supra, note 33.
80 U.S. Dep't Interior Reg., 21 Fed. Reg. 5446
81 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/L.52 (1958).

.

. Furthermore, in view of

(1956).

82 "The special features of the Norwegian coastline are-aside from its profusion of
fjords and bays-the Norwegian coastal archipelago called the 'Skjaergaard'. It consists of some 120,000 islands, islets and rocks, and extends along most of the coast."
This description is taken from Everson, supra note 19, at 295.
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the ratification of the Convention by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, it must be regarded as having. the approval of
this Government and as expressive of its present policy s
This convention needs only four more ratifications to come into force,
and at that time it will become binding upon signatory nations. Of
interest to note here, however, is the statement of United States practice in reference to coastal archipelagoes presented in one of the preparatory documents compiled prior to the 1958 Conference:
This country has been one of the staunchest advocates', of the view
that archipelagos, including coastal archipelagos, cannot be treated in
any different way from isolated islands where the delimitation of territorial waters is concerned. Thus, according to information received,
the practice of the United States in delimiting,for example, the waters
of the archipelagossituated outside the coasts of Alaska is that each
island of such archipelagoshas its own marginalsea of three nautical
miles. Where islands are six miles or less apart the marginal seas of
such islands will intersect. But not even in this case are straight baselines applied for such delimitation.
That the Florida Keys have been considered a unit is actually no
exception to this practice. The several islands of the Keys are situated
so close together and the waters so shallow that they must naturally be
considered as a continuous whole. (Emphasis added.) 84
In view of United States ratification of the Territorial Seas Convention, as explained above, the currency of this statement of practice to
the Alexander Archipelago is doubtful.
(2) Bristol Bay is located in the area of Alaska classified as the
North and West region.8" This region is the least developed of the
three major divisions of the state, and it boasts the highest percentage
of native population." Bristol Bay plays an important part in the
economy of this region since its fishery resources support the major
employment industry, the salmon canneries.8 7 The waters of the Bay
are comparatively shallow and in this area is one of the richest salmon83 This statement is taken from a letter written by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, January 15, 1963, directed to the subject of-the
Department of State position regarding the extent of territorial waters in Bristol Bay.
Although this statement was directed specifically at approval of Article 7, dealing with
bays, it has general significance also. This letter is attached as an Appendix to the
Brief for the United States as Ainicus Curiae, filed in the Supreme Court of Alaska in
connection with the case State of Alaska v. Arctic Maid, now. on appeal in that court.
This
8 case is covered more extensively under the discussion of Bristol Bay.
4Everson, supranote 19, at 297.
85
ALAsxA LEGISLATIVE CouNcIL, op. cit. supra note 72, at 37.
86 Id., at 51, 69. The 1960 census figures show the native population in this region to
be 11.13 per cent of the total population.
87 Id., at 60, 61, 69.
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grounds:in the world. The northern headland of the Bay is Cape
Newenham, but there does not appear to be a sharply defined southern
promontory.
Though several suggestions have been made concerning the extent of
Bristol Bay, there is no generally accepted boundary. Neither has the
Bay been considered as "territorial" or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 8

A recent Supreme Court case, State of Alaska v. Arctic Maid,89 considered the constitutionality of Alaska's fish processors tax as applied
to Washington-based vessels operating in the Bristol Bay area. Most
of the time these ships were anchored in waters beyond the three-mile
limit as measured from the low water mark along the coastline, but
employed catcher boats within that limit. The Territory [subsequently
the State] of Alaska maintained throughout that Alaskan jurisdiction
extended much farther than three miles from the coastline. The
measurement advanced to delimit Alaskan jurisdiction was a line
drawn from Cape Newenham to a point three statute miles south of
Cape Menshikof." This distance is approximately 170 statute miles.
In its brief submitted to the circuit court, the Territory urged that
the international situation was pertinent to upholding this claim.9
Finally, in view of the tense international situation, it cannot be too
strongly stressed that if appellants' argument is accepted and this Court
rules that all of Bristol and Kvichak Bays, save waters in the marginal
belt three miles from the shorelines thereof, are not United States
waters and hence open to foreign entrance and fishing, far-reaching
adverse effects on our relations with foreign nations who are interested
in the Alaska fisheries would occur.

The reply brief submitted by the freezer ship operators chided this
attempt "to influence the determination of the taxing authority of
92
Alaska by considerations of foreign relations and national defense."
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the constitutionality of
88 LEoNARD, supra note 52, at 121; in his footnote, Leonard cites two suggested
boundaries which have been advanced. The earlier of these suggestions was made in
1901 and would have drawn a line from Port Moller to Cape Newenham, approximately 180 statute miles. In 1938 a line drawn from the Northwest tip of Unimak
Island to Nuniwak Island, approximately 350 statute miles, was suggested.
9 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
90 This line was taken from the then effective Department of Interior regulations
definition of the Bristol Bay area. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 18-19, Arctic Maid v.
Territory of Alaska, 277 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1960).
91 Id., at 25.
92 Reply Brief of Appellants, p. 9, Arctic Maid v. Territory of Alaska, 277 F.2d 120
(9th Cir. 1960).
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the tax was upheld and the case was remanded for further proceedings,
but the Court made no decision regarding the extent of territorial
waters within the Bay. An express statemenV was made that the
Alaskan contention was "a claim on the merits of which we express
no opinion.""3 However, the remand put this question of 'delimiting
territorial waters directly in issue.94
In the course of appeal, the courts below had handled this claim
to extensive jurisdiction over Bristol Bay in varying manner. The
district court judge cited and recognized the three-mile rule but found
it did not apply in this case since the taking of the fisl wa's within
Territorial limits.95 In an unpublished opinion by a division of the
Ninth Circuit Court, Egegik, Kvichak and Nushagak Bays, all arms
and tributaries of Bristol Bay, were said to be within Alaskan jurisdiction by virtue of their locations and history. However, as to the
entire Bay, it was stated: "Bristol Bay is so large., and so ill defined
by geographical features that it is better described as a corner of the
Bering Sea than as a separate body of water."9" A rehearing was
granted and the case was argued before the Ninth Circuit Court en
banc. The opinion given on rehearing was substituted for the previous
division opinion, and in this later decision the court did not find it
necessary to make a specific determination of the issue. 7
When the case was remanded by the United States Supreme Court,
the Ninth Circuit in turn remanded to the Supreme Court of the State
93 366 U.S. 199, 205 n. 5 (1961).

04 The Court states, in pertinent part, 366 U.S. at 203, "If -the fish were taken or
purchased outside Alaska's territorial waters, all of respondents' business in the Bristol
Bay area would be beyond Alaskas reach. But since some of the fish in all of the
cases before us were taken in Alaska's waters or otherwise acquired there, respondents
are engaged in business in Alaska when they operate their 'freezer.'ships."' And at 205
the Court concludes, "Since we do not know how many fish; if any, were obtained outside Alaska's territorial waters, we remand the cause to the Court of Appeals for proceedings
in conformity with this opinion"
9
5Territory of Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 140 F. Supp.-190, 195 (1956).: The court
says, ".... the prosecution of the line of business of the defendants taxed ,s not the
freezing, the major portion of which is done outside the three-mile limit, bufihe taking
of the fish, all of which is done within the Territorial limits. The rule 'of 'Cunard
Steamship Co. v. Mellon... limiting the jurisdiction of the Territory over Territorial
waters within the three-mile zone, does not apply in this case."
00 This unpublished division opinion may be found in Brief for Petitioner, Appendix
A, State of Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961). The discussion regarding
Bristol Bay territorial waters is at lOa-15a, and the quotation given above is at 12a.
07 277 F.2d 120, 125 (9th Cir. 1960). The court held that the freezer ships' activities
while lying at anchor within territorial waters was an inseparable part of interstate
commerce, and the Territory's tax was forbidden by the commerce clause. Thus no
decision regarding the extent of Alaska's jurisdiction in Bristol Bay was necessary.
At 125 the court states, "A serious question is raised on this appeal as to whether the
freezer ships while at anchor beyond the three-mile limit in Bristol Bay were in territorial waters. For the purpose of considering the commerce clause question we will
assume that they were."
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of Alaska." This latter court remanded the case to a state superior
court. The decision given by the trial judge in that case upheld the
Alaskan jurisdictional claim. 9 Pertinent parts of this decision state:
What, then, does constitute the "territorial waters" of the State of
Alaska in Bristol Bay? To answer this question the extent of United
States proprietary claims over the waters of Bristol Bay must be determined, as such claims are established either by specific exposition or
general policy of the Government of the United States ...
It is clear that the area of Bristol Bay waters which may be claimed
as Alaskan waters has been adequately defined. The Government of
the United States has asserted a claim to all Bristol Bay waters landward of a line drawn between Cape Newenham and Cape Menshikof
as inland waters through interrelated administrative and legislative
action.
This case is now on appeal in the Supreme Court of Alaska. The
United States Government has filed an amicus curiae brief in this
appeal and of import is a letter written by Secretary of State Dean
Rusk which is attached as an appendix to this brief.' 0 This letter
sets out the Department of State's position on the extent of territorial
waters in Bristol Bay. Rusk notes United States approval of the Territorial Seas Convention adopted at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference, and asserts that Article 7, which provides for a maximum base
line length of twenty-four miles to enclose waters in bays, must be
regarded as expressive of present United States policy. He then continues:
Since the line drawn from Cape Newenham to Cape Menshikof is some
162 miles long, it will be apparent at once that the waters landward of
that line cannot be regarded as internal waters of the United States
under the law as set forth in Article 7 of the Convention. Consequently, the Department considers that there is no basis in international
law as presently understood and approved by the United States for
Alaska's claim to the waters in question as within its domain unless
these waters can be considered an "historic bay."
An extensive search of the records of the Department and of the
historical records of the Government at the National Archives has revealed no evidence that the United States has claimed the waters of
Bristol Bay within the line referred to as internal waters of the United
States. ...
98 297 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1961).

99 This superior court opinion is unpublished. However, a copy of the opinion is
available for reference at the University of Washington Law Library.
100 See note 83, supra. A copy of this brief is available for reference at the University of Washington Law Library.
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From the foregoing, it is evident that the Department is not aware
of any basis in international law or on historic grounds for now considering all of the waters of Bristol Bay in question as internal waters
of the United States ...
It is believed that future difficulties in our relations with other countries may be avoided if the Supreme Court of Alaska is advised of the
position of the Government on the matters referred to.

These statements by Rusk are fully consistent with United States
practice. Although the United States has generally recognized the
historic bay exception to the usual rules for delimiting territorial waters
in bays,' its vigorous protest to the Soviet claim on historic grounds
to enclose Peter the Great Bay as internal waters is indicative of the

United States position re claims to extremely wide-mouthed bays." 2
Referring to this Soviet claim Dean stated, "So far as I am informed
no other country in the world asserts exclusive right to a so-called

bay with a mouth of this size."'0 3 Peter the Great is approximately
115 miles as enclosed, whereas the Alaskan claim in Bristol Bay would
establish a 170 mile headland-to-headland distance.
In view of these United States policy pronouncements, the prob-

ability is slight that Alaska's extensive claim over Bristol Bay will
be sustained.
CONCLUSION

It may be submitted as a conclusion that the general principles of
the law of the sea set out in this comment illustrate the need for international cooperation to protect the valuable fishery stocks of the North

Pacific.
It would be unrealistic to assert the probability of an extension of

territorial waters by the United States for the benefit of the Alaskan
coastal fishing interests. The United States has consistently claimed
the three-mile limit and there is little reason to expect any change,

particularly in light of the legitimate interests which weigh on the
01 "In connection with the principles applicable to bays and straits, it should be
noted that they have no application with respect to the waters of bays, straits, or
sounds, when a state can prove by historical usage that such waters have been traditionally subjected to its exclusive authority." This quotation is taken from a letter
dated November 13, 1951, from James E. Webb, Under Secretary of State, to J. Howard McGrath, Attorney General, in reply to the Attorney General's request for a statement from the Department of State in regard to the United States position as to criteria
which govern delimitation of United States territorial waters. This letter is reprinted
in Hearitkqs before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisherieson H.R.
9584, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. at 38 (1954).
102 See note 27, supra. This protest was based on both geographic and historic
grounds.
103 Dean, supra,note 27.
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other side of the balance between wide versus narrow territorial seas.
However, other avenues are open to protect coastal fishing interests.
The United States position regarding the validity of conservation
efforts is well illustrated by the Presidential Proclamation of 1945,1'
and by its continued participation in collective action with other nations to effect treaties protecting fishery stocks. This attitude of international cooperation is reflected in the following statement: "There
is not, in the view of the United States, any fundamental and legitimate
interest of coastal states . . . which cannot be satisfactorily reconciled

through a procedure of international agreement based upon a negotiation among states enjoying equal sovereignty and equal rights.' 0 5 The
solution to North Pacific fishery conflicts will undoubtedly lie along
this avenue. That these four nations have been able successfully to
utilize this approach with regard to conservation of one fishery resource
is amply illustrated by the convention for the protection of fur seals.
The potential ineffectiveness of any agreement reached without the
cooperation of all four of the North Pacific fishing powers is apparent.
The fruit of the conservation and abstention efforts of the signatory
nations could be harvested without restraint by non-member nations.
The alternative approach of free exploitation by all carries the equally
obvious hazard of probable future extinction of certain ocean stocks,
thereby injuring all. In this reality lies the real hope of international
cooperation to protect the North Pacific fisheries.
BEVERLY

J.

ROSENOW

The main portion of the text of this proclamation is cited supra, note 50.
105 32 DEP'T STATE BULL. 696, at 697 (1955).
104

